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Studies on (un)evenly distributed compulsory elementary education range from inter-regions, 
urban-rural areas, social classes and inter-schools. The purpose of this study is to examine 
stratifications derived from uneven compulsory elementary education quality in Beijing, mainly 
about inter-school and inter- social class comparisons. Key schools, which will be illustrated in 
detail later, break the balance among schools, leading to many social issues, such as education 
stratification among students from different socio-economic classes, and among schools. Also 
with the unique context of Beijing, School District System adds up to problems caused by 
uneven compulsory elementary education quality across eight counties in Beijing City. This 
study is divided into three parts, the first part is the stratification in schools, mainly about their 
financial statistics which reflects the financial power. Financial data for two elementary schools, 
one key school and one ordinary one, in Haidian County demonstrates key schools attracts more 
money, either from parents or government.  
The second part is education stratification among students. To reveal that families’ socio-
economic status plays a role in students’ education choices, I use hedonic pricing model to 
analyze school quality1’s influence on real estate market in Beijing City. Further, broad survey 
centering on parents’ opinions in Beijing City could provide better understanding of the status 
quo of compulsory elementary education stratification among students. It is the goal of this study 
to provide planners, policy makers, and future researchers some insights on the socio-economic 
impact of key schools in Beijing.  
                                                          
1 In this study, education quality and school quality is interchangeable. Firstly, it is hard to quantify education 
quality; secondly, from empirical observation for over 60 years, key schools have comparably high education 
quality.(see Footnote 1) 
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Public services, like public transit, medical service, and green spaces, are important 
factors of quality of urban life. Among these public services, compulsory elementary education 
resources gain increasing attention from governments, schools, developers, parents and 
grandparents because education has been a key channel for upward mobility in China(Xiaogang 
Wu, 2010). Due to the unevenly distributed public services, stratification has been a pressing 
problem in Beijing City, let alone migrant families from other cities2. This study is centered on 
stratifications derived from compulsory elementary education in Beijing City, on both school 
side and registered citizen3 side.  
The scarcity of high-quality education, or say key elementary schools in Beijing City 
which takes up less than 10% among all elementary schools, is the main culprit for the dilemma 
for both schools and families with students. On school side, key elementary schools originate 
from some historical reasons in 1950s, which will be explained later. The uneven status gained 
momentum in 1978 right after Cultural Revolution. Compared with key elementary schools, 
ordinary ones get less funding, fewer political subsidies, and lower public attention. This kind of 
Matthew Effect4 will be illustrated in the financial comparison of two schools. This trend is 
unchanged over 30 years, and is becoming worse (Daozhu Huang, Fenghua Xu, 2010). In 
addition to financial attraction, teacher-student ratios, construction area per capita, and class size 
could demonstrate the stratification, too; however, given the difficulty of quantifying these 
                                                          
2 This is another big issue in social science, not the main concern of this study.  
3 Household Registration System in China. 
4 In sociology, the Matthew effect (or accumulated advantage) is the phenomenon where "the rich get richer and 
the poor get poorer."(Gladwell, Malcolm, 2008) 
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factors and constrains of open data in Beijing City into consideration, this study will not cover 
them.  
On the parent/student side, different socio-economic classes accumulate remarkably 
different economic/political power, reputations, and social networks (Fang Li, 2007). One 
common feature for all classes is that parents are willing to incur significant sacrifice to provide 
educational opportunities for their children. Cultural and social influences at this stage determine 
the rigid demand for key elementary schools.  
The unique context of Beijing City is the School District System, aimed at getting 
students enrolled in the nearest schools. But this School District System only considers 
homeowners, not renters. Conflict between scarcity of high-quality education and the rigid 
demand for it directly leads to status quo of the abnormal real estate market in Beijing City.  
“In a society famous for stressing education, parents across China must now pay sky-high costs 
to own property — as rentals don't count — in the enrollment districts of well-regarded 
establishments,” criticized USA Today reporter Calum MacLeod (2013).5 For example,  two 
buildings, one inside schools district of Zhongguancun No.1 Primary School6 and another not 
inside the district, the difference in average price per square meter is CNY7,600. They share 
similar characteristics, such as: close to each other, both built in 1990s in similar building types 
but the discrepancy in the price of real estate between the two is too large not to notice.7 Beijing 
City is not the only city experiencing this phenomenon, Shanghai (Hao Feng, Ming Lu, 2010), 
Wuhan, and Shenzhen are on the list. In Beijing context, what’s the significance of key school in 
                                                          
5 USA TODAY: http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/07/04/china-cost-of-education/2489899/ 
6 A key elementary school 
7 Soufun.com 
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this abnormal real estate market? Hedonic Pricing model can help answer this question, which 
will be illustrated later in Methodology part.  
For classes with advantages in any perspective, parents might use the economic power, 
political power or social networks during the school selection process to facilitate upward 
mobility. Those disadvantaged parents would strive as much for students’ better education. 
Beyond buying expensive properties, parents can pay school selection fee for key elementary 
school enrollment, which is over CNY 60,000 in average. Hence, what are public opinions 
toward such kind of socio-economic stratifications? A broad survey is conducted to answer this 
question. 
 Much of the existing literature about uneven elementary education quality is largely 
focused on inter-region disparity, rural-urban issues or migrant children’s education. While a 
large body of studies have been devoted to Beijing real estate market analysis as a reflection of 
location choices and economic trend, few of them are centered on School District System and 
education qualities.  
The purpose of this study is to reveal two specific problems derived from key elementary 
schools: stratification among schools, and different socio-economic classes. Further, as one key 
channel for upward mobility in current China, what is public opinion towards status quo? Based 
on SOUFUN data8, National Statistics Bureau survey data, interviews with school 
administrators, and my broad survey data, this study will diagnose side effects of uneven 
education quality to some degree and indicate the significance of equality. Hope this study can 
arouse awareness in urban planning, public policy and infrastructure sectors in Beijing, and 
provide clues to step toward more evenly distributed education quality. 
                                                          
8 SouFun operates the leading real estate Internet portal in China in terms of the number of page views and visitors 
to its websites in 2014. http://china.soufun.com/ 




School Choices: Origin and National Contexts 
Historically and culturally, Chinese society places a high value on education. Having 
learning is a source of esteemed social status. In imperial China, individuals spent years studying 
for the government’s civil examination so as to become a government official. The education 
system during the Republican China period tended to be fragmented and highly differentiated, 
with limited access that favored students from privileged backgrounds. Families from well-to-do 
backgrounds undoubtedly had more schooling options for their children. 
Education experienced a radical transformation since 1949, with the founding of the 
People’s Republic of China. Traditional private education institutions at all levels were promptly 
converted to government institutions by the new government. Between 1949 and the early 1990s, 
traditional private education vanished in the Chinese education system. The conversion was 
consistent with the heavy emphasis on the role of the State in a socialist country; it was also 
motivated by the government’s attempt to rid the country of western influences and to remove 
educational differences due to school type which was thought to be related to the socio-economic 
background of parents. The egalitarian ideal was strong, in society and in school. School choice 
was not made available to parents. Between 1949 and the early 1980s, the collective or 
nationalist ideology was dominant, and individual goals were submerged in favor of social goals.  
During the post-1949 period, expanding educational access was consistently a focus of 
educational policy. Over time, the government managed to essentially achieve universal primary 
education; and by 1985 the major educational goal was universal compulsory education by 
around 2000 (People’s Press, 1985). Access to higher levels of schooling was purportedly based 
on merit, particularly on performance in examination. However, government spending on 
 7 / 48 
 
education was persistently low, both in terms of national-effort and fiscal-effort indicators. This 
low-spending level imposed a serious constraint on educational development in China and 
contributed partly to the school choice problem in the 1990s. 
Chinese Nine-year Compulsory Education System and Governmental Effort 
The nine-year compulsory education has been implemented at various levels of 
government since 1986, when the Compulsory Education Law of the People’s Republic of China 
was issued. It takes 12 years to complete primary and secondary education in mainland China, 
including primary, junior secondary and senior secondary school in three stages. Primary 
education lasts either five or six years.9 At the junior secondary stage, almost 98% students 
attend three-year schooling, along with a tiny part enrolled in four-year schooling. The total nine 
years of education in primary and secondary schools pertains to 9-year compulsory education. 
Generally, senior secondary education lasts another three years, which, along with the former 
nine years, is called K12. The structure is illustrated by Table 1.  
Table 1 K12 Education Structure 
 







5 years 35% 
6 years 65% 
Junior High 
3 years 98% 
4 years 2% 
 Senior High 3 years 99% 
 
The 4th Nationwide Census Survey in 1990 showed that there were 182 million 
illiterates10 among adult people11, taking up almost 23% of the total population. Accompanied 
                                                          
9 Data from china.org.cn: 9-year Compulsory Education in China. 
10  Illiteracy in Chinese is usually written as 不识字或识字很少, that is, illiterate or recognizing very few characters. 
11 15 years old or over. 
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with China’s economic development was China’s giant effort towards popularizing education, 
showing in the following table 2. There is no doubt that since 1980s China has devoted much 
funding and labor into education and made giant effort towards compulsory education.12 
Table 2 China's Effort for Education Expansion13 
Time Milestone Significance/Content 
1986 




10 Central Government Agencies 
tele-conference 
Set up the goal to help 4,000,000 illiterates 
become “neo-literates” annually 
1992 
the 14th National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China 
The nine-year compulsory education and the 
eradication of illiteracy all over China were 
emphasized and discussed in details for 
further implementation 
1993 
The Outline for Educational 
Reform and Development in China 
To achieve the goal of reducing illiteracy 
rate among 15- to 45- year old population to 
5% or lower 
The Regulations for Illiteracy 
Eradication was revised 
encapsulating all levels of governments 
1994 
The Suggestions for the 
Implementation of the 
Universalization of 9-year 
Compulsory Education 
Emphasized the importance of illiteracy 
eradication and proposed three-step plan to 
meet the goal The Eradication of Illiteracy 
Among Middle-Aged and Young 




Top-down mechanism to evaluate 
the effort toward education 
expansion 
More than 20 evaluations through random 
sampling by State Education Inspectors were 
organized to monitor the progresses 
2006 
The Compulsory Education Law 
was renewed 
It requires compulsory education to be fee 
free 
                                                          
12 Wang, J. (1986). An overview of China's ongoing education reform. Canada Saskatchewan. 
13 All information is from Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China website: http://www.moe.gov.cn/ 
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Just similar to other goods or services, governmental support spurs the education supply 
side, with more education opportunities. On the demand side, sustainable economic growth relies 
on skilled labor, stimulating public willingness to get educated and demand for schools, 
especially elementary and middle schools. The expansion of education not only boosts culture, it 
also improves living standard of people, along with the upgrading in quality of labor force, 
which in turn motivate local economy.  
Still what makes compulsory education different from other public services is the 
government effort in fostering Key Schools. In 1950s, Beijing Municipal Commission of 
Education designated 40 City Level Key Elementary Schools. These key schools attract much 
more resources as a result of political subsidies. Due to the increasing emphasizes on equality 
and sustainability, at 2000 or so the Key School System was abolished, but the long-term 
influence insists. Till now, there are around 60 “key elementary schools”, with comparably high 
reputation, good quality in both hardware and software, higher key middle school ratio, and solid 
financial and political power. (Siqi Zheng, Wanyang Hu, Rui Wang, 2015)  
Government’s emphasis on public service equity 
In recent years, China has witnessed fast urbanization pace, at an annual 1 to 1.5 percent 
growth. In 2012, the urbanization rate reached 52.6%, expecting to reach about 70 percent or 
even higher by 2030. Similar to other countries who have also undergone fast development, 
China’s economic miracle is accompanied by inequity in income, infrastructure, medical care, 
education and other social aspects. Different levels of Chinese governments already realize that 
China has a long way to all-around, well-off society. Figure 1 and 2 show public services in 
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Beijing and Beijing City14. Unevenly distributed public services15 are illustrated. The summary 
of green spaces, and 9-year compulsory schools is listed in Table 3. Area of Beijing City only 
takes 8.34% of total area of Beijing; however, green spaces, tertiary16 hospitals, elementary 
schools and junior middle schools have comparably high ratio, at 60.2%, 89.4%, 63.4% and 
54.9% correspondingly.  
Table 3 Public Service Unevenly Distributed 
 Beijing City Beijing Beijing City/Beijing Ratio 
Total area (Km2) 1,368.32 16,410.54 8.34% 
Green spaces (Km2) 120.32 199.96 60.2% 
Tertiary Hospitals 41 47 89.4% 
Elementary schools 438 691 63.4% 
Junior middle schools 276 503 54.9% 
                                                          
14 8 counties (Chaoyang, Chongwen, Dongcheng, Fengtai, Haidian, Shijingshan, Xicheng, Xuanwu) constitute Beijing 
City; and Beijing Municipality is composed of Beijing City and 10 other counties.  
15 Data from Beijing City Lab, excluding some schools with undefined locations or unclear names. 
16 Tertiary hospitals round up the list as comprehensive or general hospitals at the city, provincial or national level 
with a bed capacity exceeding 500. They are responsible for providing specialist health services, perform a bigger 
role with regard to medical education and scientific research and they serve as medical hubs providing care to 
multiple regions. 





Figure 1 Green spaces in Beijing and Beijing City 
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Figure 2 Tertiary Hospitals in Beijing and Beijing City 
 
Confliction between tertiary hospitals and demand for high medical services is also a pressing 
problem in China, especially in Beijing. Figure 2 shows the spatial allocations of tertiary 
hospitals, and only 6 tertiary hospitals are located outside Beijing City. Except 8 counties in 




Figure 3 Elementary & Junior High School in Beijing and Beijing City 
 
 
Aware of such pressing problem, the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of 
China carried out the strategy of new-pattern urbanization, which is supposed to promote the 
justice of public service during the next stage of urbanization. Also, this strategy is aimed to lift 
quality of urban life, and to increase the Happiness level17 of residents. In addition, the Third 
Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 
November 2013 also put forward an explicit proposal, including a main goal to balance the 
allocation of public resources. Actions were taken at the city/provincial level, too. Beijing 
Municipal Government put forward the "Green Beijing" Development Guidelines in the Twelfth 
Five-Year, to balance the allocation of public services, especially in terms of education, medical 
service and green spaces. This political direction indicates that China, on its way of rapid 
development, now takes not only quantity but also quality into its consideration.  
 
Status quo of elementary school choices in Beijing 
The effort to accommodate parental choice in schooling is a rather recent phenomenon in 
education in China. Basically only those who own properties in certain school district can get 
their children enrolled in corresponding school. Parental choice in school is a departure from 
School District System and it can take one of the following forms: 
1. Buying properties inside aimed school district is the most straightforward way. Only 
owning properties is not enough, students GPA must meet the standard. 
2. Without properties inside aimed school district, parents should pay a relatively high 
school-selection fee. But the amount is set by the school, not by Beijing Municipal 
Commission of Education.  
                                                          
17 Happiness level is measured by Gross National Happiness-GNH.  
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3. Students with a lower GPA which doesn’t meet the certain threshold for admission have 
to pay an admissions fee to the school, which is much lower than school-selection fee. 
4. Comparably high socio-economic class can needle their way to key elementary schools, 
either by social relationship, or by political/financial power. 
Key elementary schools attract students and parents. One can easily capture the extreme 
trend of housing prices in certain school districts.  
 
Financing structure of compulsory education 
Since the early 1980s, the financing of education in China has undergone a fundamental 
structural change from a formerly centralized system with a narrow revenue base to a 
decentralized system with a diversified revenue base. The financial reform in education took 
place in the context of a large public-finance reform in the country. In February 1980, the State 
Council initiated the piloting and subsequently large-scale implementation of the decentralized 
system of “tong shou tong zhi”, meaning complete collection and complete distribution, in which 
revenue from all lower levels of government were supported by central government and 
expenditures by lower levels of government were supported by central funds. The 
decentralization of public finance was based on the principle that each level of government was 
responsible for its own finances. By 1982, a multi-level public finance system began to emerge, 
with budgets at the central, provincial, county, and township levels.  
The official government policy for the financial reform of basic education was 
promulgated by the Chinese Communist Party in 1985. This policy consisted of two major 
components: decentralization in educational administration and financing, and diversification in 
the mobilization of educational resources. Educational decentralization was based on the 
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principle that lower levels of government are responsible for the provision of education, with 
different levels of government administering different levels of education. A common 
arrangement for counties is that the village, township, and county governments are respectively 
responsible for the provision, administration, and financing of compulsory education. For cities, 
a common arrangement is that the county and city governments are respectively responsible. 
Resource diversification consists of two strategies: broadening the base for government 
education revenue, and broadening and identifying non-government resource mobilization at the 
school level. The first strategy involves the collection of education surcharges in urban areas and 
education levies in rural areas. The second strategy consists of the collection of social 
contributions to education, school-generated funds, external funds, and school fees. A primary 
objective of the 1985 reform is the mobilization of additional resources for compulsory 
education through decentralization and diversification (Xiaoyu Chen, 2012). 
It was apparent that, by the early 1990s, a decentralized financing system with budgeted 
(government allocation) and out-of-budget (surcharges & levies, social contributions, school-
generated resources, school fees) sources was well in place for compulsory education. It was also 
clear that, in the context of sustained and rapid economic growth, substantially more resources 
were raised for education in general and for compulsory education in particularly. For example, 
from 1986 to 1992, government budgeted allocation increased by 3.5% per year and out-of-
budget funds by 19.7% per year in 1992 constant price. Per student budgeted spending increased 
by 9.6% per year at the primary level and by 5.1% per year at the secondary level. The increase 
in out-of-budget funds was especially rapid, resulting in a significant change in the distribution 
of revenue for compulsory education. In terms of additional resource mobilization through fiscal 
decentralization and diversification, the 1985 reform was a success.  
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However, local governments have strong incentive to invest in projects that could quickly 
reap profits and generate tax revenues, resulting in a low priority for investment in education.  
This decentralization financing pattern contributed to two major deficiencies, visible by the early 
1990s: the financial difficulties of poor and rural areas, and large disparities in per-student 
spending among areas and regions. These two deficiencies persisted and even intensifies in the 
1990s and 2000s (Shanmai Wang, Chunling Li, 1991). 
Due to previous planning and development in the long history, the remarkable gaps 
between urban and rural areas, different tiers of cities/towns, and different counties even within 
one city inflict challenges for local governments, especially in the perspective of high-quality 
public service. Urbanization is accompanied with migration from rural to mega cities, 
contributing to the complexity of public service supply-demand issue, which in turn adds up to 
















The literature review contains two parts. The first part explores the inequity of 
compulsory education in China and its historical reasons, such as economic reforms since 1978. 
Some sociologists like, Brandt, Loren(2008), Herston, and Alan(2008), have been interested in 
investigating who wins and who loses in the institutional transition, with literature concerned 
about the returns into human capital (education) as a result of the market transition. Only a few 
scholars have explicitly examined the impact of economic reforms on unequal access to 
educational opportunities.  
The second part is mainly about significance of unequally distributed education qualities. 
From researchers like Siqi Zheng, and Matthew E. Kahn(2013), the imbalance between demand 
and education resources in terms of spatial distribution led to many serious urban issues. Long 
distance to favorable public services not only cost citizens time and money, but also creates 
external social costs, ranging from worsening road conditions, increase in air pollution, and to 
lower efficiency of city function and economic development. Still, in the unique context of 
Beijing, the irrational reflection of real estate market is also derived more or less, from the 
inequity of education resources, especially high quality ones.18 
1. The economic growth contributes education uneven expansion 
1.1 The gap in different social classes 
There is no doubt that the central government intended to promote educational 
opportunities for all its citizens, but economic reforms in rural areas slowed down progress to a 
                                                          
18 Reuters News report(2013), “In Beijing housing market, education drives location”, by LI HUI, BEN BLANCHARD. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-school-housing-idUSBRE9B70C320131208#WjoElIUSFcTlxpTU.97 
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certain extent and yielded a negative impact on school enrollments (Dewen Wang, 2003). On the 
one hand, rural-urban disparity plays a central role in social classes. The household responsibility 
system implemented in rural China since 1978 drove rural children out of school for agriculture 
labor and employment in the rural industry, contributing to the decline in the school enrollment 
rate in the mid-1980s.  
The gap between rural and urban education resources is not the main argument for my 
research; however, mobility in China increases, leading to the working class influx into 
megacities, such as Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen. Wei Jianwen and Hou Jiawei(2010) 
analyze a sample from a census in Beijing and find that the Hukou system and the related school 
district system are the main barriers for children, either “local” children or migrant children.  
Further evidence demonstrates that patterns of education stratification underscores the 
intergenerational inheritance of family social status (Xueguang Zhou, Phyllis Moen, Nancy 
Brandon Tuma, 1998). In this case, Xueguang Zhou(1998) also mention about the vicious cycle 
and virtuous cycle in intergenerational influences. For example, parents who can afford to send 
their children to schools with high school selection fees can thereby foster their children’s 
accumulation of social and cultural capital, which, in turn, promote the children’s educational 
and career advancement.  
1.2 The decentralized fiscal reform adds up to unequal education resource 
At the beginning of economic reform, right after the culture revolution, to fasten the pace 
of talent cultivating, Chinese government and local governments divided schools into different 
tiers, with different subsidiary policies. Due to the unequal political and fiscal subsidies, these 
key schools got more funding and other education resources, increasing the gaps between 
schools. Even the official definition of “Key Schools” is dismissed now, key schools still have 
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high reputation and high education quality, attracting more funding, resources, and students 
(Ling Wu, Yuan Liu, 2012). 
Moreover, the fiscal reform in education in the early 1990s exacerbated the situation. In 
the context of the decentralization of public finances in China since the early 1980s, the 
responsibility of funding nine-year compulsory education was shifted to local governments who 
had had a strong incentive to invest to projects that could quickly reap profits and generate tax 
revenues, resulting in a low priority for investment in education. The uneven regional economic 
development further differentiated local governments’ capacity in funding education. In some 
poor counties, local government could hardly raise sufficient revenue to cover teachers’ salaries, 
not to mention other non-instructive costs (Xiaogang Wu, 2010).  
In contrast, local governments in developed areas could mobilize significantly more 
resources, both government and non-government for education. This has resulted in the 
substantial disparities in per-student educational expenditure across areas and regions, which 
directly leads the different qualities of compulsory education.  
2. Significance of unevenly distributed compulsory education 
The unequal spatial distribution of education resources is now a most pressing problem 
for governors and planners, which has led to many other issues, ranging from fluctuate real 
estate, terrible transportation condition, to family stability and social segregation. Some local 
governments have realized the inequity among schools. For example, Hefei government invited 
The Urban China Initiative to advise its strategic planning of public facilities which serve its 8 
million residents and increasing influx of migrants, especially for education resources.19 
                                                          
19 UCI Advises Hefei City on Public Facilities Planning. 
http://www.urbanchinainitiative.org/en/content/details_19_61951.html 
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Given that individuals have differing personal valuations on these services and varying ability to 
pay the attendant taxes, individuals will move from one local community to another, which 
maximizes their personal utility.  
Comparably higher real estate prices surrounding top schools 
For residents, the accessibility to public services has become a key factor for quality of 
urban life. Balanced allocation of public services provides cities more advantages to attract 
capital and investment (Siqi Zheng, Yangfei Xu, Yizhen Gu, 2014). For local governments, 
public services and the spatial allocation should be the main concerns to improve life quality and 
local economic efficiency, especially for education, medical service and public spaces.  
The influence of school district system on real estate market is now studied by many researchers 
and reported by many critics. Among these studies, many scholars use Hedonic model to 
quantify the influence of schools, which is a model identifying price factors according to the 
premise that price is determined both by internal characteristics of the good being sold and 
external factors affecting it. I will explain it in detail in Methodology part.  
Table 4 Housing Prices in different primary school districts, Haidian County (Yiming Wang, 2015) 
Types of primary schools Slab-Type Apt Tower-Building Apt Average  
Key schools at City Level ￥69,729 ￥67,662 ￥70,043 
Key schools at County Level ￥52,396 ￥51,937 ￥52,483 
Ordinary schools ￥51,681 ￥51,865 ￥52,149 
Unit: CNY 
Also, Yizhao Shi and Yiting Wang (2013)used hedonic model to figure out the schools’ 
influence on Shanghai real estate market, and found the coefficient as high as 20.63%, indicating 
that with other factors similar, the high-quality school district housing prices are 20.63% higher 
than ordinary ones. Also, in an online survey conducted by IFeng Education in 2009, 6.5% 
parents said that they are willing to buy school district houses no matter the cost is. 57.3% 
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parents’ responses are willing to buy school district housing as long as the education quality is 
better than other schools. 20   
Traffic congestion led by students’ commuting 
Tons of literature has indicated that during peak hours in the morning and evening on 
weekdays, about 10% of total traffic on roads in Beijing is primary school students related, 
which increases total congestion level by 15%-20%. Still, emissions further worsen Beijing air 
pollution, increasing the concentration of PM10
21. At the meantime, low-income and other 
vulnerable groups such as migrant workers are more likely to be extruded from favorable 
locations. With strikingly different accessibilities to public service, there come many social 
justice issues.   
According to the data from Beijing Transportation Research Center, 20% among all 
students at the stage of nine-year compulsory education commute to and from schools use auto 
vehicles, indicating parents drive their children to and from schools. Furthermore, for key 
schools at County level, the proportion increases. The Center made a survey about 3 key schools 
in Haidian County and 1 key school at Dongcheng County and found that over 60% students use 
auto vehicles for commuting. 22 
The disparity between school district system and congestion 
If the school district system is successful, students with their parents should live near to 
schools, with 2-kilometer buffer area. But the reality is that students’ commuting also add up to 
                                                          
20 http://edu.ifeng.com/zhuanti/zexiao/ 
21 PM10 or Particulate Matter up to 10 micrometers is one major group for particles in bigger size in the air, 
between 2.5 and 10 micrometers. PM10 are mainly about smoke, dirt and dust from factories, farming and roads. 
PM10 can cause health problems, especially respiratory health (the lungs and airway). Definition from Air Info 
Now, http://www.airinfonow.org/html/ed_particulate.html 
22 Details are in the report about Pilot School Bus Program Feasibility Analysis and Related Supporting Measures, by 
Beijing Transportation Research Center. http://www.bjtrc.org.cn/ 
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the congestion problem. According to Siqi Zheng, 2 explanations can help answer this disparity. 
One is that even under the school district system, some students or those who have already been 
studying at certain schools, still need to travel long way with auto vehicles. Another explanation 
is that in order to send their children to favorable schools, parents bought school district housing 
at high price with poorer living qualities than their current housing. Hence, even they are 






















To study the stratifications both among schools and among different socio-economic 
families, this study employs three main methodologies: case studies of school financial statistics, 
Hedonic pricing analyzing real estate market, and broad surveys. 
1. Case Study by Interview and Government Statistics 
Beijing does not provide public access to data related to school financial subsidies, 
selection fees, expenditure per student, and even the teacher-student ratio. To reveal financial 
subsidy stratification on school side, I interviewed 4 administrators from 2 schools to obtain 
financial statistics. Documentation review is also used to confirm the statistics’ reliability, either 
in growth rate of the average number for each item, or second hand data in reports. Table 5 
shows the details of my interviews.  
Table 5 Interview Details for School Finance 
County School Name Label Content 
Haidian 
County 
Elementary School Affiliated to 
Renmin University of China 
(referred as K school) 
Key school at 
City Level 
Government allocation; 
School selection fee; 
School-run business; 
Tuition & Miscellaneous 
fee; Others.23 
Beijing Haidian Chedaogou 
Elementary School  
(referred as O school) 
Ordinary school 
 
Haidian County and Chaoyang County are two counties with the most key elementary schools. I 
chose two schools in Haidian County for two reasons: 
                                                          
23 According to fiscal decentralization, these 5 kinds of income mainly constitute total financial income of primary 
schools in Beijing. (Xiaoyu Chen, 2012) 
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1. To avoid the different contexts in different counties. From Background chapter, we 
understand that the County governments play a role in elementary schools’ financial 
structure.  
2. Having spent 4 years in Haidian County, I have accumulated some social resources which 
helped me during this case study.  
3. 2 administrators in each school can help me figure out controversial statistics. In this 
case, I will need additional interviewers to prove information. Actually the difference in 
two interviews are minimal, no larger than 5%. Average is used. 
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2. Hedonic pricing model analysis for real estate market 
Hedonic pricing model is a model identifying price factors according to the premise that 
price is determined both by internal characteristics of the good being sold and external factors 
affecting it. The most common example of the hedonic pricing method is in the housing market: 
the price of a property is determined by the characteristics of the house (size, features, condition) 
as well as the characteristics of the surrounding neighborhood (accessibility to schools and parks, 
public transportation condition, etc.)  
In the light of newly emerging big/open data, I can use the property prices on Soufun 
website, helping me with the abnormal real estate market analysis. Here web scraping is the 
practice of using a computer program to sift through a web page and gather the data that you need 
in a format most useful to you while at the same time preserving the structure of the data. Then I 
use ArcGIS to carry out spatial calculation for distances, based on hedonic pricing model.  
By this model with enough data, I could analyze the influence of key primary schools, on properties 
located inside its school district.  
Here are 4 assumptions in my analysis:  
a) The factor that one property is located in key primary school district has positive influence 
on property prices.  
b) Soufun website does provide information about which school districts one property is 
located in. However, that’s based on straight-line distances to key primary schools, but not 
the accurate information designated by Beijing Municipal Commission of Education. My 
analysis is based on information on Soufun website. 
c) For the internal characteristics like FAR, Building ages are dismissed in my analysis. One 
reason is that according to Siqi Zheng (2014) these internal characteristics only play 
 27 / 48 
 
minimal roles in property prices. Another reason is constrains of data. Web scraping from 
Soufun is limited to certain amount of properties, especially when I acquire more 
information.  
d) Key Primary & Junior Middle School list is downloaded from Beijing public government 
data.24 The key schools are designated as City Level or County Level. This is reasonable 
to assign equal weight for key schools at City Level and County Level, since they have 
both comparably high reputation and quality that attracts parents and students. 
 
According to my hypothesis, housing price (in logs) is the dependent variable. Whether 
inside key primary school district or not is a most important variable in analysis. Other factors 
ranging from physical features of neighborhood to location features.  
Hedonic pricing is like the following: 
log𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = 𝑎0 + 𝐴1 × 𝑋1𝑖 + 𝐴2 × 𝑋2𝑖 +⋯+ 𝐴3 × 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦3𝑖 + 𝜀 
𝑋1𝑖,  𝑋2𝑖 are independent variables like distance to Tian’anmen Square, distance to nearest subway 
station, etc. 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦3𝑖 represents County Dummy to dismiss influences across different counties. 
Beijing City is constituted of 8 counties (Chaoyang, Chongwen, Dongcheng, Fengtai, Haidian, 
Shijingshan, Xicheng, Xuanwu), so in this analysis 7 County Dummies are included. Table 7 





                                                          
24 Website: www.bjdata.gov.cn.  
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Table 6 Variables in Spatial Analysis 
Variables Description Source 
Housing Price (in log) The average listing selling prices per square 
meter in one community on Soufun in 
October 2014, shown in Table 7. 
Soufun.com  
Distance to subway 
station (in log) 
The distance to nearest subway station. Beijing City Lab 
Distance to parks The distance to nearest parks. Beijing City Lab 
Distance to Tian’anmen 
Square (in log) 
Tian’anmen Square is considered as city 
center.  
 
Distance to Teritary 
hospitals (in log) 
The distance to nearest high quality medical 
service. 
www.bjdata.gov.cn  
Distance to nearest 
schools (in log) 
The distance to nearest primary schools. www.bjdata.gov.cn 
Whether inside key 
primary school districts 
To assign binary to properties: 
Inside = 1; 
Outside = 0. 
www.bjdata.gov.cn 
Soufun.com  
County Dummy Dummy for different counties, to avoid 




Table 7 Descriptive Statistics of observations in Beijing 
County Average price  
(CNY/sqm) 
Number of observations 
in total 
Number of observations 
inside key school district 
Chaoyang 41,069.0 1853 718 
Chongwen 47,219.9 109 97 
Dongcheng 54,533.1 426 407 
Fengtai 33,250.3 931 311 
Haidian 47,568.9 1315 683 
Shijingshan 29,181.0 72 0 
Xicheng 59,996.6 335 250 
Xuanwu 42,523.8 268 251 
Others 19,233.6 2523 86 
    
Sum/Ave 35,764.9 7832 2803 
Note:  
a) Here one observation indicates one community with its average property price. 
b) Others means the observation is in Beijing but outside Beijing City. 
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c) Table 7 shows descriptive statistics of observations obtained by web scraping. The 
disparity in property prices is remarkable, with Others much lower than 8 counties in 
Beijing City. From the perspective of inside school district observations, Chaoyang and 
Haidian draw our attention, as the top 2.  
 
3. Survey and Its Sampling 
Broad survey here is also vital to know public attitude towards compulsory education and 
the stratifications. By selecting interview subjects closely related to compulsory primary 
education, or say parents or grandparents, more insights and stories could provide more 
information about the inequity among schools.  
Local schools’ administration, time and spatial bias of physical surveys constrained a lot 
and might lead to biased results. Hence, I switched to online survey among targeted people, via e-
mail, and Wechat & Moment25. The composition of subjects is listed in following figure. 
Figure 5 Composition of Responses 
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All respondents are current residents in Beijing. 130 among all these 132 respondents, or 
say 98.5% say yes to the first question, “Have you or your friends ever experienced school 
selection for (grand)children?”. This is nothing surprising, due to Chinese emphasize on 
education. The sample questionnaire is attached as appendix.  
 The objective of the three methodologies is to understand stratification on both school side 
and student side. Also, broad survey help us understand of the current compulsory education 





















As mentioned before, the whole analysis will fall into three parts, stratification among 
schools, among families, and public opinions upon compulsory education in Beijing City, which 
will give a hint for urban planners and decision makers in future development.  
1. Stratification among schools, in financial attraction perspective 
For stratification among schools, financial statistics not only serve as financial attraction 
indicators, but also a reflection of political preference (Siqi Zheng, 2011). Hence, more 
government budget also indicates more political powers for key schools. 
 
 
Figure 6 Total Income per Student 
The financial statistics of two schools, Elementary School Affiliated to Renmin 
University of China (referred as K school) and Beijing Haidian Chedaogou Elementary School  






































K school O school
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a) Disparity in Total Income per Student jumped since 2003 when the difference was only 
tiny as shown in Figure 6. In 2015, Total Income per Student of K school almost triples 
that of O school. This finding in turn verifies that along with giant economic 
development was stratifications in every public sector. (Xaogang Wu, 2010) 
b) Financial budget per student from government even reversed since 2000, with K school 
surpasses O school by ￥21,482 in 2015, constitutes 79.87% of the difference in Total 
Income per Student. 
c) Besides Financial budget per student, difference in school selection fee per student in 
2015 takes 12.71% of total difference. 
d) However, school selection fee per student constitutes 14.91% and 18.79% for K school 
and O school, correspondingly. This finding is beyond my expectation: for O school, 
school selection fee even takes larger portion of total income per student. If taken migrant 
students into consideration, the seemingly abnormal finding is reasonable, according to 
one interview I made.  
“For some migrant workers, school-selection fee is way too high compared with their net 
income. You know, rent in Beijing is also high for these migrant workers. Hence, they 
would choose ordinary schools for their children, which is already the best choice 
without exceeding their economic endurance. If not, their children have to go to some 
low-quality migrant-child schools.” 
Key schools, with their excellent performance in academia and education, are considered 
as one perspective of achievement of local government. The more investment into key schools 
leads to higher quality in enrolled students, better teachers, and even more supports from charity.  
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The consequences of stratification among schools are barely constrained just among 
schools.  
When a public-school system based on equity and “equality of opportunity” is embedded 
within a capitalistic society, it can be a little disorienting for students, parents, and 
teachers, said Michael Godsey26. 
This stratification in financial attractions reflects political preference. A salient feature of 
resources arrangement in China (and other state socialist societies in general) is the monopoly of 
almost all resources in the hands of the centralized state. This centralization allows the state to 
transfer resources among different economic sectors, localities, and social groups on a much 
larger scale and at a much faster pace than market economies can do. Hence, key schools have 
much more advantages over ordinary schools, in the perspective of resources attraction.  
The education agencies can proclaim its twin goals of access and excellence with a 
confidence, but when the system is constructed in a way so that individual school’s or parent’s 
motives incidentally hinder those who don’t have the same advantages, the compass can be 
difficult to read. But the conundrum of public school inequality shouldn’t be ignored. 
Apparently, the “sorting” of high- and low-achieving students by key schools causes 
uneven distributions early on. 
We see our kids entering their compulsory education in the same system, but actually 
they are entering a filter, with varieties of criterion both in schools and families’ socio-
economic conditions, said one administrator I interviewed. 
So beyond stratification in schools, families’ socio-economic classes also plays a main 
role in the compulsory education selection of students.  
                                                          




Table 8 Two schools' financial statistics 
  2000 2003 2007 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Total Income 
per student 
K school  14,429   11,890   16,670   17,790   23,186   25,027   29,323   32,611   37,838   42,148  
O school  6,015   9,190   11,318   11,411   12,061   12,187   13,468   13,739   14,603   15,251  
Financial 
budget 
K school  2,523   5,714   8,737   10,757   15,451   17,336   20,030   23,087   27,788   31,745  
O school  3,963   5,635   6,795   7,486   8,023   8,265   9,024   9,389   9,864   10,262  
School selection 
fee 
K school  7,102   2,394   3,041   3,481   4,577   4,575   5,528   5,695   6,041   6,285  
O school  187   1,680   2,271   2,527   2,488   2,309   2,668   2,477   2,728   2,866  
School-run 
business 
K school  1,375   545   706   808   1,063   1,062   1,284   1,322   1,403   1,460  




K school  831   1,117   1,597   -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
O school  742   942   987   -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Others 
K school  2,598   2,120   2,588   2,744   2,095   2,053   2,481   2,506   2,606   2,658  
O school  25   4   144   164   227   249   288   326   384   430  
Unit: CNY/student 
Note:  
a) Since 2008, compulsory education is gradually free of Tuition and Miscellaneous Fees, including fees for tuition, textbooks, 
facilities, uniforms, etc. 
b) Transfer fee from another school, school construction fee, and other items fall into Others.  
 
 
2. Elementary education quality plays a role in real estate market, in Beijing City 
As mentioned in Research Methodology part, 5029 observations are located in Beijing 
City. By Surface Modelling with 7832 observations, the trend in real estate market is revealed in 
Figure 7. The closer to Tian’anmen Square which is shown as a red five-pointed star in figure, 
the higher property price is.  
Some areas stand out, for example, Zhongguancun, which is a technology hub in Haidian 
County and also famous for concentration of education institutes, both compulsory education and 
higher education. 
 
Figure 7 Property Price Estimation in Beijing City by surface modelling in ArcGIS 
 
However, the above map only reveals that distance to Tian’anmen Square plays a 
significant role in determining property prices. Hedonic pricing model provides us further 
analysis, including whether inside key elementary school districts, as shown in Table 9. 
















Distance to subway station 
(in log) 
-0.025 * -0.0381 ** -0.0181  -0.0142  -0.0143  
Distance to parks -0.039 **   -0.0416 ** -0.0366 ** -0.0341 ** 
Distance to Tian’anmen 
Square (in log) 
-0.269 *** -0.2491 *** -0.2869 *** -0.2588 *** -0.3071 *** 
Distance to Tertiary 
hospitals (in log) 
-0.070 *** -0.0880 ***   -0.0600 *** -0.0427 ** 
Distance to nearest key 
schools (in log) 
    -0.0822 * -0.0657    
Whether inside key 
elementary school districts 
0.101 *** 0.0811 *** 0.0546 ** 0.0617 ** 0.118 *** 
           
number of observations 5029 5029 5029 5029 5029 
R2 0.152 0.140 0.150 0.151 0.170 
Note:  
a) All coefficients are standardized coefficients. Here the standardized coefficients are obtained in the regression results, when we 
standardize all of the variables in the regression, including the dependent and all of the independent variables, and run the 
regression.  By standardizing the variables before running the regression, we’ve put all of the variables on the same scale, and 
we can compare the magnitude of the coefficients to see which one has more of an effect.  We will also notice that the larger 
betas are associated with the larger t-values and lower p-values, indicating more significant the variables are.   
b) ***, ** and * denote 0.1%, 1% and 5% significance level, correspondingly. The more asterisks, the results are more 
significant.      
 
 
Based on different assumptions, I ran 5 regressions to certify that the results are reliable 
and robust. In these 5 models in Table 9, Distance to Tian’anmen Square has a comparably larger 
magnitude than Distance to subway station, Distance to parks, and Distance to Tertiary hospitals, 
but they all inflict negative impacts on property prices. 
Whether inside key elementary school districts is the targeted variable in this study, 
displaying a consistent effect on property prices: if the community is located inside key 
elementary school districts, the property price gets higher. The magnitude almost offsets half that 
of Distance to Tian’anmen Square, which means education quality does play a main role in 
determining property prices. When going back to Figure 7, one can easily know the magnitude of 
educationquality. Education stratification in socio-economic classes here is also certified.  
This kind of selection by buying properties, or say by families’ socio-economic 
conditions, distort the real estate market and add too much financial burden for families. The 
average property price per square meter is ￥47,568.9 in Haidian County, so for a 60 square 
meters apartment (one bed/one bath apartment), the total cost is ￥2.85 million. Compared with 
￥43,910, the average annual income per capita in Haidian County in 2015, the price means a 
couple need to work 32.5 years without any expenditure, which is impossible for ordinary 
families! 
As a main upward mobility path, good compulsory education benefits these who can 
afford it, which in turn accumulate the family’s socio-economic resources.  
We want to give our kids the best education we can afford, but the reality is always cruel 
for us. If our kids end up in a struggling life to make ends meet just like us, we cannot forgive 
ourselves, said a couple.  
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As an essential public service, education does make everything hard for middle classes. 
Next I will reveal general opinions towards current education condition in Beijing. 
 
3. People’s preference towards getting students high quality education 
The third part of analysis is based on my survey among Beijing residents, detailed 
information is listed in Research Methodology part. The gathered data tells us several interesting 
findings. 
 
Figure 8 People's Willingness to pay for children’s school selection 
To the beginning, parental sacrifice in China is revealed here through their willingness to 
pay for children’s school selection, especially compared with the average annual income per 
capita, which is CNY43,910. 31.70% parents are willing to pay over CNY20,000 for their 
children’s school selection, not to mention all kinds of expense for education; 6% parents are 
determined to pay whatever it cost to help their children get into desired elementary schools, 
according to the survey results. 
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%







No matter how much
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Figure 9 Preference towards different school selection methods 
Figure 9 gives us a glimpse of preferable ways to get into desired elementary school, 
according to the survey among Beijing (grand)parents. Among the listed 6 ways, 5 ways are 
based on families’ socio-economic status, except for Trying to get admitted as special talent. 
Also, Figure 10 reemphasizes the stratification both among families and schools.   
 
Figure 10 Side effects of school selection 
Among these side effects, Some schools collect money in unauthorized ways draws my 
attention, right after Adding financial burden to families. Actually, this is derived from 
decentralization without mature regulation.(Shanmai Wang, 1991) 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
Transfer household registration
Pay school selection fee
Through personal social relationship
Buy school district housing
Try to get admitted as special talent
Execute authority in unauthorized way
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
Add financial burden to families
Some schools collect money in
unauthorized ways
Equity in education is neglected
The gaps among schools grows wider
Examination-oriented education is
emphasized
Rent-seeking for public power, especially
for key schools
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Figure 11 Who should be responsible for current dilemma? 
When coming to responsibility, parents themselves are escaping. But they know clearly 
that schools are just passive among all stakeholders, with current situation. Even the general 
public lack of information about education system, the answers still allude something. The 
decentralization of finance and administration provides more power for local education agency, 
without mature regulations.  
4. Other social issues related with unevenly distributed education qualities 
Actually I intended to analyze further about students’ commuting time in the survey, but 
only got 10 responses of that question. People don’t want to talk about their commuting time. 
Obviously, some families just bought inside key school district properties but don’t live in there.  
I bought an extra apartment inside Zhongguancun No.1 Primary School 3 years ago for 
my son’s education. But I don’t like that apartment, which is tiny and old but really expensive. 
That apartment is rented to a couple who work at Zhongguancun. Every day I have to get up 
earlier than before to get my son to his school, and then head to my office. The same for after 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
Local education government agency
National education government agency
Schools
Parents
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school time. Since my son starts his compulsory school here I barely have time for a movie in the 
evening, said one mom whose son is enrolled in Zhongguancun No.1 Primary School. 
This is a common phenomenon for most young parents, who have their jobs in CBD but 
want to get their children better education. The increasing commuting time, not only results 
heavier traffic on road, but also places more stress among young parents both financially and 
mentally. Then this brings a broader issue in transportation planning, environmental planning, 

















 42 / 48 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
The scarcity of high-quality education, or say key elementary schools in Beijing City, and 
the rigid demand of high quality education from students, along with School District System, 
make the whole situation seemingly complicated. However, as direct or indirect result, 
stratifications among schools and families should be paid enough attention.  
On school side, key elementary schools get more funding than ordinary ones; on 
parent/student side, families with more economic/political power can get their children into 
desired schools, in various ways. Among these ways, buying school district property is 
demonstrated in this study. The feature that whether a property is located inside a key elementary 
school district does contribute to its prices. 
But why school selection exists? Figure 11 gives us clues. The top 1 reason is gaps 
among schools, which in turn contributes to stratification among elementary schools. This 
vicious cycle is rooted in historic path. Actually, all reasons listed in Figure 11 have been 
criticized ever since 1990s.  
 
Figure 12 Why school selection exists?  
0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
The gaps among schools
Pressure from college entrance examination
Parents pay too much attention on students' grades
Quality-oriented education is unimplemented
The gap in different schools' financial budget
School district system is unimplemented
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So how to better current condition? Based on my analysis and data, this study is to arouse 
the awareness of unevenly education quality, and clue urban planners and decision makers in 
future projects. From parents’ views, demolishing all kinds of school selection fee is the most 
effective way to improve status quo, which in my opinion is impossible. The current dilemma is 
derived from the tension between demand and supply; even without school selection fee, there 
should be another way for key elementary schools to choose students, and for parents to select 
desired schools for their children. Similar reason for quality-oriented education, which is hard to 
be quantified.  
My survey about this question brings up another problem: the general public don’t have a 
clear image of elementary education in Beijing. Also, implementing school district system 
strictly might exaggerate the stratification in socio-economic classes. 
 
 
Figure 13 Preferable recommendation for governments 
Previous analysis about stratification on both school side and parent/student side provides 
hint for us. However, it is hard to narrow down gaps among socio-economic classes (MUN C. 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
Demolish all kinds of school selection fee
Implement quality-oriented education
Teachers and administrators should exchange cross
schools in comparably long term
Subsidies for ordinary schools, including finance,
education quality and hardware
Implement school-district system strictly
Support private schools
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TSANG, 2001), which means we’d better narrow down gaps among schools or decrease 
opportunities to use socio-economic power. 
Firstly, to ease the tension between the scarcity of high-quality elementary education and 
rigid demand, private schools are alternative. In fact, private schools in Beijing have taken 10% 
of elementary education market, either as full-time or part-time. (MUN C. TSANG, 2001)  
Secondly, the gap between key elementary schools and ordinary ones could be narrowed down 
by the exchange system, which is an old idea originated in 1980s. In this system, teachers and 
administrators will exchange in a fixed period, balancing education quality of different school. 
In addition, subsidies for ordinary elementary schools, both in political and financial, may help 
to certain degree. If ordinary elementary schools also have comparably high education quality, 
the stratification in schools might be alleviated.  
On the demand side, we’d better spread general knowledge of compulsory education 
system and encourage them to choose private education. This is still the balance between supply 
and demand, but in a complicated system.  
In terms of policy, the encouraging news is that Beijing already begins to ease its 
previously strict school district system since 2015, but we need to wait until the condition 
stabilizes to make conclusion. Also, to either increase the supply of private education, or 
encourage parents to choose private schools or ordinary schools with good quality, instead of 
needling their way to key schools, information transparency is important. 
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Appendix: Survey and Summary 
 





1. Have you or your friends 




2. In your opinion, why 
school selection exists? 
 
The gaps among schools 63.90% 
Pressure from college entrance examination 56.50% 
Parents pay too much attention on students' grades 55.50% 
Quality-oriented education is unimplemented 48.80% 
The gap in different schools' financial budget  48.60% 
School district system is unimplemented 34.00% 
3. List the top 3 or more 
side effects of school 
selection. 
Add financial burden to families 72.40% 
Some schools collect money in unauthorized ways 64.80% 
Equity in education is neglected 63.60% 
The gaps among schools grows wider 60.70% 
Examination-oriented education is emphasized 46.30% 
Rent-seeking for public power, especially for key 
schools 
39.70% 
4. Who is responsible for 
the current condition in 
compulsory education? 
 
Local education government agency 
 
71.50% 
National education government agency 68.50% 
Schools 40.30% 
Parents 24.80% 
5. How to handle with 
school selection dilemma 
Demolish all kinds of school selection fee 68.10% 
Implement quality-oriented education 63.90% 
Teachers and administrators should exchange 
cross schools in comparably long term 
57.70% 
Subsidies for ordinary schools, including finance, 
education quality and hardware 
57.70% 
Implement school-district system strictly 42.60% 
Support private schools 33.00% 
6. Preference towards 
different ways for school 
selection 
Transfer household registration 59.60% 
Pay school selection fee 49.10% 
Through personal social relationship 40.40% 
Buy school district housing 35.50% 
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Try to get admitted as special talent 27.90% 
Execute authority in unauthorized way 5.80% 
7. Willingness to pay for 
children's school selection 
No intention to pay for school selection 22.80% 
<10,000 24.60% 
10,000 - 20,000 20.90% 
20,000 - 50,000 16.10% 
50,000 - 100,000 6.40% 
100,000 - 200,000 1.80% 
>200,000 0.90% 
No matter how much 6.50% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
